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Precedent in Contract Cases and the Importance(?) of the Whole Story 
Robert A. Hillman 
Introduction 
 I am honored to contribute to this symposium in honor of Bill Whitford.  I 
have been an admirer of Bill's work for the past 39 years, which encompasses my 
entire teaching career.  Bill's scholarship on contracts and consumer law in his law 
review articles and in his casebook, Contracts: Law in Action, now in its third 
edition with Macaulay, Braucher, and Kidwell,1 confirms the importance of 
examining the non-legal forces at work in exchange transactions, the sometimes 
tenuous relationship between contract rules and legal decisions, the limitations of 
legal opinions, and the value of focusing on the relationship of contracting parties.  
 In this essay, I begin with a brief description of Bill and his coauthors' 
casebook in order to capture the contributions and importance of their perspective 
on teaching contract law.  I then turn to Bill and Stewart Macaulay's recent debate 
with Bob Scott on the meaning of the record in Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores,2 a case 
that figures prominently in Bill and Stewart's and most other casebooks. I use the 
fascinating back and forth between these three prominent authors as a jumping off 
point to ponder the appropriate role of telling the whole story in important cases.   
I.  Contracts: Law In Action 
 The preface to the second edition summarizes the perspective of Contracts: 
Law in Action.  Critical of the classical view of contract law, Bill and his coauthors 
"reject the idea that contract law is no more than a small collection of timeless 
                                                            
 Edwin H. Woodruff Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.  Thanks to Kevin M. Clermont and 
Bill Whitford for reading and commenting on this paper.  
1 Stewart Macaulay, Jean Braucher, and John Kidwell, Contracts: Law in Action (3d ed. 2010). I 
will speak of Bill's work with the understanding that Bill's important collaborators deserve much 
credit too.  
2 133 N.W. 2d 267 (Wis. 1965). The debate is set forth in Robert E. Scott, Hoffman v. Red Owl 
Stores, and The Myth of Precontractual Reliance, 68 Ohio St. L. J. 71 (2007) (hereinafter Scott, 
Myth); William C. Whitford and Stewart Macaulay, Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, The Rest of the 
Story, 61 Hastings L. J. 801 (2010) (hereinafter Whitford and Macaulay,The Rest of the Story) 
and Robert E. Scott, Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores and the Limits of the Legal Method, 61 
Hastings L. J. 859 (2009) (hereinafter Scott, Legal Method). 
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principles."3  Instead, to understand contract law, the student must appreciate 
contract law's role in a dynamic society in which numerous extra-legal forces 
influence the exchange process, including the hope for future dealing and 
reputational concerns.  A focus on "law in action," the authors point out, leads to 
many additional insights, such as  "that law is not free; most disputes end in 
settlement; crafting nice-sounding legal standards is one thing but finding evidence 
to establish a cause of action is another; and that all institutions including the 
market are flawed."4  In short, contract law is "messy," and the sooner students 
understand this, the better. For that matter, this reality is also an important lesson 
for analysts who too often base their conclusions on unrealistic assumptions about 
what happens "on the ground."5 
 In an early section of the casebook, in an essay on the casebook's method, 
Bill and his coauthors elaborate on these ideas, focusing more fully on what they 
call the "gap between the law on the books and the law in action."6  To fill the gap, 
the casebook includes a multitude of enriching materials.  For example, Chapter 3, 
"Contract and Continuing Relations," includes almost 40 pages of materials on 
employment at will, including an introduction that details the evolving nature of 
the labor market, the history of the at-will doctrine, and the rise of legal protection 
for employees.7 Included are insights about contingent-fee litigation,8 the politics 
behind the selection of judges and their impact on judicial decisions,9 California's   
treatment of exceptions to at-will employment,10 the relationship between 
employment at will and the free market,11 and the costs of limiting employment at 
                                                            
3  Contracts: Law in Action, Volume I, Preface to the Second Edition, at v (2d ed. 2010). In Bill 
and Stewart's article, "The Development of Contracts:  Law in Action" at 7(draft 2014) 
(hereinafter Macaulay and Whitford, Development), they elaborate on their view of the meaning 
of "law in action": The term involves "how in fact, as opposed to in theory, statutory law and 
case precedent come into being, how people and businesses use contracts to manage their lives, 
how disputes in the performance of contracts arise and are settled, and how the resolution of 
disputes affects the parties to the disputes and influences future parties to contracts." 
4 Contracts: Law in Action, Volume I, Preface to the Second Edition, at v (2d ed. 2010). 
5  Macaulay and Whitford, Development, supra note   , at 7. 
6 Contracts: Law in Action, Volume 1, at 25; see also id. at 15-29.   
7 Id. at 436-447. 
8 Id. at 443. 
9 Id. at 442, 444. 
10 Id. at 444-447. 
11 Id. at 467-468. 
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will.12 Other parts of  Contracts: Law in Action include, for example, Bill's 
interviews with Matt Zeidenberg's lawyer, (Zeidenberg was the defendant in the 
leading case of  ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg)13 and with Joseph Hoffmann,14 and a 
discussion of the record in Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores.15  Only the least inquisitive 
students would want to ignore these rich materials. 
 
 More doctrinally focused casebooks invite insights into the law in action too 
(and Bill and his coauthors do not disagree).  For example, realities that Bill and 
his coauthors identify, such as the role of lawyers in planning transactions and 
lawyers' efforts at settlement are not hidden in the study of case decisions, at least 
not if the instructor pitches in with good questions. Cases involving quarrels over 
the parol evidence rule or the interpretation of contracts, for example, invite 
questions about how litigation could have been avoided or about the appropriate 
settlement strategy. Further, the need for balancing the "security of transactions" 
and regulation to prevent unfairness in contract exchanges16 is the inevitable 
conclusion of the juxtaposition of successful and unsuccessful cases on 
unconscionability and other policing doctrines.  Such cases also reveal that most 
contracts involve standard forms and adhesive formation strategies.  Moreover, 
Bill and his coauthors urge students to understand the "contradictions within 
contract law."17 Today, few if any contracts casebooks hide this ball in order to 
devote more room for "details of doctrinal refinements."18  
 
 In the end, the goal for casebook compilers should be to find the appropriate 
mix of rules and principles, on the one hand, and supplementary materials, on the 
                                                            
12 Id. at 470-471. 
13 Id. at 606-607; see also Appendix, ProCD v. Zeidenberg in Context, 2004 Wis. L. Rev. 821. 
14  Contracts: Law in Action, supra note  , at  . 
15 Contracts: Law in Action, supra note  , at 386-389. See also Whitford and Macaulay, The Rest 
of the Story, supra note  .   There is, of course, much more. 
 In part inspired by the law-in-action approach, the first chapter of Robert S. Summers and 
Robert A. Hillman, Contract and Related Obligation (6th ed. 2011) traces an agreement from 
formation, to performance, to breakdown, and to the various stages of litigation. The book also 
contains pleadings, lawyer correspondences, secondary sources elaborating on law-in-action 
issues, etc., so hopefully Bill would approve of our approach. 
16 Contracts: Law in Action,  Volume 1, supra note  , at 17. 
17 Id. at 18. 
18 Id.   
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other.  Bill and his coauthors find that the mix should lean rather heavily toward 
the law in action.19  Inevitably, then, users of Contracts: Law in Action certainly 
can be confident that the casebook artfully brings the realities of lawyering to light. 
Others may feel that the casebook is a bit too light on doctrine. 
 
 I now want to address Bill's and Stewart Macaulay's debate with Bob Scott 
about the Red Owl case. This debate richly contributes to understanding the 
importance of the law in action. 
 
II. The Debate between Whitford-Macaulay and Scott on the Red Owl Case 
 
 Contracts: Law in Action quotes Wittgenstein to identify perhaps the 
paramount question challenging legal authors who supplement their treatment of  
judicial opinions with surrounding facts: "'Is it even always an advantage to replace 
an indistinct picture by a sharp one?'"20  Bill's scholarly work on cases such as 
ProCD and Red Owl Stores sharply reveals his answer to this question.  Bill digs 
into the background of cases including interviews of litigants and their lawyers and 
studies case records because he believes that such work is crucial for 
understanding contract law as it functions in the real world.  The "indistinct 
picture" presented by judicial opinions is thus far too shallow and incomplete. This 
perspective motivated Bill and Stewart to respond to Bob Scott's informative 
analysis of the facts of Red Owl Stores.  
 Notwithstanding that negotiations for the grant of a Red Owl franchise to 
Hoffman broke down,21 the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Red Owl concluded that 
Hoffman’s precontractual reliance on Red Owl’s promises and assurances of a 
franchise justified a jury award of damages under the doctrine of promissory 
estoppel. The court stated that  
[t]he record here discloses a number of promises and assurances * * * which 
plaintiffs relied and acted upon to their detriment. Foremost were the 
promises that for the sum of $18,000 Red Owl would establish Hoffman in a 
                                                            
19 Macaulay and Whitford, Development, supra note   , at 13. 
20 Contracts: Law in Action, Volume 1, supra note  , at  . 
21 The debaters reverted to the actual spelling of Hoffman, which has an additional n at the end.  
Apparently the court simply was mistaken as to the spelling. 
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store. * * * Hoffman was induced to sell  his grocery  store fixtures and 
inventory * * * on the promise that he  would  be  in his new  store by fall. 
In November, plaintiffs sold their bakery building on the urging of 
defendants and on the assurance that this was the last step necessary to have 
the deal with Red Owl go through.22   
 Bob Scott's conclusion after studying the trial transcript in Red Owl, 
however, was that the court wrongly affirmed the jury's finding that Red Owl 
promised to grant Hoffman a franchise. Instead, the parties were simply 
negotiating, with Red Owl reticent because of its concern that Hoffman would 
have insufficient capital to invest in the venture. Moreover, Scott asserted that 
Hoffman knew that Red Owl's agent, Lukowitz, the divisional manager, did not 
have the authority to commit Red Owl to grant a franchise.23 Scott's thesis, 
therefore, was that the court should not have granted Hoffman promissory estoppel 
relief.   
 Bill and Stewart also studied the trial record, along with interviewing 
Hoffman and reading the appellate briefs in the case. In an extensive analysis of 
these materials, they concluded that Red Owl did in fact make a promise, albeit not 
the one that they thought was the court's focus.24  Bill and Stewart reasoned that the 
agent's statement that an investment by Hoffman of $18,000 would be enough was 
insufficient for many reasons.  For example, the parties had not ironed out most 
details, such as the financial plans for the deal and a site for the franchise.25 
Instead, Bill and Stewart concluded that at a later time in the negotiations, after 
Hoffman and Red Owl officials met, Hoffman had disclosed the state of his 
finances, and Red Owl gave him their financial plan, "a jury could have found that 
Hoffman[] was told that the 'only hitch' holding up award of a franchise was selling 
the bakery and that Hoffman[] relied on this statement."26 Moreover, Hoffman 
                                                            
22 133 N.W. 2d at  . 
23 Scott, Myth, supra note  , at 95. 
24  Bill and Stewart focus on the court's statement that "[f]oremost were the promises that for the 
sum of $18,000 Red Owl would establish Hoffman in a store."  But in the same paragraph the 
court identifies additional assurances, including one that induced the Hoffmans to sell their 
bakery building. 133 N.W.2d at   
25  Whitford and Macaulay, The Rest of the Story, at 846-847. 
26  Id at 850. 
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reasonably relied on the Red Owl agent, Lukowitz, who made this statement.27 Bill 
and Stewart therefore concluded that the case was decided correctly and that 
"justice was done."28 
III. The Contribution of the Red Owl Debate 
 There are many things to admire about this scholarly debate, not the least of 
which is the degree of care and the amount of effort that the debaters invested in 
examining the facts of the Red Owl case.  But of course, the debaters deserve 
kudos for much more than extending lots of time and energy unearthing more facts 
about the case.   
 Especially interesting for academics and their students, the debate yields a 
more accurate description and assessment of the facts of a leading contracts case, 
even if the debaters ultimately disagreed about precisely what had happened and 
what the result should have been. This enriched understanding allows readers to 
form their own conclusion over whether justice was done. It also helps the reader 
identify the values and policies at stake in reaching that conclusion. (More about 
these later.29) These alone are significant accomplishments. 
 The debate also underscores the value of "the law in action" approach. For 
example, readers can better appreciate the possible motives of the Red Owl parties, 
their reasons for litigating, and their litigation strategies.30  The debate also 
sharpens the tools lawyers employ for, among other things, searching for and 
determining necessary facts and for determining litigation strategies.31 Further, 
readers better appreciate the nature of legal doctrine and its interaction with facts 
and policy.32 
 Perhaps more important for students and lawyers, the debate helps isolate 
and define the crucial issues and elements of applying promissory estoppel in the 
                                                            
27  Id. at  849. 
28  Id. at 801; see also id. at 806. 
29  See infra notes   , and accompanying text. 
30  Id. at 837-846; Scott, Legal Method, supra note  , at 871 ("The law-and-society scholar might 
support the 'found promise' story by once again providing a richer and deeper context to explain 
Hoffmann's behavior."). 
31  Judith L. Maute, Response:  The Values of Legal Archaeology, 2000 Utah L. Rev. 223, 225. 
32  Id. at 229. 
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negotiating setting. The debaters' search for a promise by Red Owl and reliance by 
Hoffman helps define precisely promissory estoppel's elements and their nature in 
this setting and raises a red flag about the importance of finding a distinct and 
actionable promise and reasonable reliance on it.  The need for caution and a focus 
on the facts is brought home by Bill and Stewart's distinction between the court's 
conclusion as to the actionable promise (that Hoffman would receive a franchise if 
he invested $18,000), which occurred early in the negotiations, and the assertion by 
Lukowitz that "the only hitch" was that Hoffman had to sell his bakery, which 
occurred after his finances and Red Owl's plans were on the table.33 
 The debate also underscores the policy issues at stake in applying 
promissory estoppel at the bargaining stage. Most fundamentally, it raises the issue 
of the limits of freedom of contract. Should Red Owl have any precontractual 
obligation to Hoffman? Further, following other commentators, Bill and Stewart 
worry on efficiency grounds that without promissory estoppel people like Hoffman 
would be deterred from making precontractual investments that ultimately benefit 
both parties.34  Further, they are concerned that reliance without a remedy will 
enable promisors to "hold up" the relying party to extract greater gains than 
otherwise would be available.35 In addition, Bill and Stewart argue that parties such 
as Hoffman and Red Owl have tacitly agreed that Hoffman can recover for his 
reliance and that courts should enforce this implied agreement.36  Scott, on the 
other hand, points out that promissory estoppel in this context harmfully places 
handcuffs on prospective bargainers by stifling their ability and willingness to 
bargain.37 Ultimately, of course, the appropriate decision depends on balancing 
these policies in light of the facts of a case.38 
IV. The Limits of the Whole Story 
                                                            
33  Whitford and Macaulay, The Rest of the Story, at 850. I therefore doubt that Bill and 
Stewart's approach "eschew[s] abstraction, prediction, and generalization," Scott, Legal Method, 
supra note  , at 869, or that it merely is an "occasion for identifying and vindicating the 
preexisting rights of the litigants." Id. at 873. 
34 Whitford and Macaulay, The Rest of the Story, supra note  , at 855. 
35 Id.  
36 Id. 
37  Scott, Legal Method , supra note  , at 872 ("Freedom from liability for honest expressions of 
future intention that are later withdrawn encourages parties to negotiate freely without fear that 
their initial expressions of interest will be binding."). 
38 For my view, see infra notes  , and accompanying text. 
8 
 
 In this part, I want to raise some questions about historical exploration of 
cases to reveal what I think are some limitations of such work.  To be clear, for the 
reasons I only touched upon in my discussion in Part III, I believe the debaters 
performed a great service for students, lawyers, and scholars by their work on the 
Red Owl case.  But the debate does raise some interesting quandaries too, 
especially about Red Owl's precedential value, which is my focus here. I will 
address the following questions: Based on the facts as the court found them, is the 
decision in Red Owl an unfortunate precedent? Should courts rely on the unearthed 
facts in Red Owl?  What does the use of such facts portend for the future of 
promissory estoppel in the bargaining setting?  
A.  Based on the facts as the court found them, is the decision in Red Owl an 
unfortunate precedent? 
 With the benefit of hindsight, specifically knowledge of the development of 
promissory estoppel for over almost 50 years beyond the Red Owl case, it is fair to 
say that promissory estoppel in any setting has not had a huge impact in any 
manner that should cause alarm.  In fact, the theory has not been very successful in 
the courts. My study of two years of cases in the 1990's showed that promissory 
estoppel was successful on the merits in only about 8 percent of the cases 
brought.39  But what about applying promissory estoppel specifically in the Red 
Owl precontractual setting?  It appears that promissory estoppel has been no more 
successful in this context. 40 So it does not appear that Red Owl has done much 
harm even if wrongly decided, other than perhaps encouraging some unsuccessful 
litigation.41 
 Nevertheless, at first blush it appears that both Bill and Stewart on the one 
hand and Bob Scott on the other believe that the Red Owl opinion is unhelpful in 
                                                            
39 Robert A. Hillman, Questioning the 'New Consensus' on Promissory Estoppel: An Empirical 
and Theoretical Study, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 580 (1998).  A quick sample of promissory estoppel 
cases this fall suggests that the success rate has not changed. 
40 Bob Scott reports that in his survey of 108 cases decided between 1999 and 2003 involving 
precontractual reliance eighty-seven percent decided against the promissory estoppel claim. 
Scott, Legal Method, supra note  , at 859, 862.  See also Scott, Myth of Precontractual Reliance, 
at 98. 
41 See also infra notes   , and accompanying text. 
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explaining the boundaries of liability for precontractual reliance, with the 
implication being that it is indeed a worrisome precedent.  Bill and Stewart write:  
Scott has referred to Hoffman as an unfortunate case that, because of the 
attention that it has received, has retarded thinking about the precise limits of 
a rule allowing recovery for precontractual reliance.  We agree that because 
the court does not explain why Lukowitz's statement about the $18,000 
should be considered a promise rather than a mere opinion or enthusiastic 
encouragement, the opinion does not help explain the limits on 
precontractual reliance.42 
Bill and Stewart ultimately conclude, however, that under their view of the facts 
Red Owl was decided correctly and that promissory estoppel belongs as a potential 
cause of action at the negotiation stage.43 
 So, is Red Owl a worrisome precedent?  Even accepting the facts as the 
court related them, I do not believe so.  The facts recited by the court portray an 
unequal bargaining relationship in which the stronger party, Red Owl, a large 
established business, through its agents, repeatedly made assurances that Hoffman, 
the operator with his wife of a local bakery for about five years, would get a 
franchise.44  In fact, the court referred to Red Owl's communications as 
"assurances" at least five times in the course of the opinion.  Red Owls' 
communications certainly contained conditions--buying and then selling a grocery 
business, selling their bakery business and building, purchasing an option on a lot--
but Hoffman met all of them even as Red Owl continuously upped the monetary 
ante.45 Moreover, the jury found and the court affirmed that Hoffman was 
reasonable in relying on Red Owl's agent, Lukowitz, for relaying messages from 
the home office.46 Certainly on grounds of justice there is room for legal doctrine 
                                                            
42 Whitford and Macaulay, The Rest of the Story, supra note   , at 854-855. 
43 See supra Part II. 
44 133 N.W. 2d at    .   
45 "The record here discloses a number of promises and assurances given to Hoffman by 
Lukowitz in behalf of Red Owl upon which plaintiffs relied and acted to their detriment." 133 
N.W.2d at  .  
46 Bill and Stewart point out that "the Hoffmanns were reasonable in viewing Lukowitz as an 
agent authorized to communicate messages from those headquarters officials."  Whitford and 
Macaulay, The Rest of the Story, supra note  , at 851. They focus on Lukowitz's statements after 
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to protect the weaker relying party under these circumstances whether we call it 
promissory or, even better, equitable estoppel.47   
 In addition, I believe that each of the reasons for finding for Hoffman 
identified by Bill and Stewart and referred to above—the efficiency, coercion, tacit 
agreement rationales--apply under the facts as related by the court.48 This is so 
because each of these rationales ultimately depends on whether Hoffman 
reasonably relied on Red Owl, a supposition that I would argue was satisfied 
whether we call Red Owl's statements representations, assurances, or promises.49 
In addition, even if liability for precontractual reliance had spiraled as a result of 
the case, the decision would not have seriously disrupted the bargaining strategies 
of businesses.  After all, Red Owl's agents were not compelled to assure Hoffman 
continuously that the deal was going through. For that matter, it would not have 
taken much for Lukowitz or other agents to mention that Red Owl had no legal 
obligation until the deal was consummated.  Perhaps Red Owl's agents allowed 
their hope for a commission or other advancement to cloud their communications 
with Hoffman.50 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Hoffman had met with Red Owl officials, who reviewed Hoffman's financial statement and 
drafted a financial plan.  Id. at 852. 
47  "Perhaps a franchise negotiation between a sophisticated franchisor and a relatively 
unsophisticated franchisee presents * * * a case" for preventing "exploitation." Scott, Legal 
Method ,supra note   , at 873.          
 Equitable estoppel may be a better fit because the sum total of all of the assurances, 
representations, and conduct of Red Owl proves the fairness of protecting Hoffman's reliance, 
not just one or more isolated promises or assurances. Scott concedes that Lukowitz may have 
been "careless in his initial representation that $18,000 'would not be a problem.'" Scott, Legal 
Method , supra note  , at 867.  Careless conduct or language that induces reasonable reliance is 
tort-like in nature and hence a natural for equitable estoppel. However, Scott reports that 
equitable estoppel is a defense that cannot create a right of recovery under Wisconsin law. Scott, 
Myth of Precontractual Reliance, supra note, at 88. He suggests that other legal doctrines might 
better apply to the case. For example, Scott suggests applying rules that govern preliminary 
agreements. Scott, Legal Method, supra note  , at 877-880. 
48  See supra notes   , and accompanying text. 
49  Scott points out that the court applied an objective/subjective test of Hoffman's reliance, 
meaning that the court took into account what a reasonable person in Hoffman's "shoes" would 
have done. Scott, Myth of Precontractual Reliance, supra note  , at 87-88.  I disagree with Scott's 
assertion, however, that courts do not apply this test in promissory estoppel cases but, instead, 
apply a solely objective test. Id. at 97. 
50 See id. at  93. 
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 But now let's assume, for the sake of argument, that under the court's 
recitation of the facts, Red Owl is wrongly decided because the facts do not 
establish a distinct promise, representation, or assurance on which Hoffman could 
reasonably rely. I'll go out on a limb here and assert that the decision is nonetheless 
a valuable precedent in the development of promissory estoppel. This is so because 
the description of the law in the case carefully established the requisites for a 
successful promissory estoppel claim. The court invoked the Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts section 90's clearly set forth elements of promissory estoppel and 
noted that the record "discloses a number of promises and assurances given to 
Hoffman by Lukowitz in behalf of Red Owl upon which plaintiffs relied and acted 
upon to their detriment."51  So courts should have understood that a recovery 
requires a clear promise and reasonable reliance regardless of whether they 
believed that the Red Owl court was on a firm factual footing. 
 The Red Owl court's repeated emphasis on Red Owl's multitude of 
assurances alone should have alerted courts that only reasonable reliance 
establishes a promissory estoppel claim. Clearly, the accumulation of such 
assurances influenced both the jury and the Wisconsin Supreme Court.  The 
decision, even if wrongly decided, also accentuated the need to distinguish 
assurances that are too uncertain to rely on and those that qualify as promises.52 
Although Bob Scott asserts that precontractual assurances are invariably too 
indefinite to induce reasonable reliance, this is not always true.  For example, 
reliance on an assurance may be reasonable even if many terms are undecided if 
the custom in the particular industry is to rely in those circumstances.53 
 Perhaps, though, I do not have to speculate about the influence of Red Owl 
even if wrongly decided. As already noted, future courts, applying promissory 
estoppel have been relatively parsimonious in finding its elements, so the holding 
                                                            
51 133 N.W.2d at  . 
52  "[A] representation does not qualify as a promise if the undertaking is uncertain or unclear * * 
*." Scott, The Myth of Precontractual Reliance, supra note  , at 90.  
53 For example, in the movie industry the parties rely on unsigned "deal memos." A jury found 
Kim Basinger liable for $8.9 million after refusing to perform in the worst movie ever made, 
"Boxing Helena." See Michael S. Bogner, The Problem with Handshakes: An Evaluation of Oral 
Agreements in the United States Film Industry, 28 Colum. J.L. & Arts 359, 361-62 (2005) 
(discussing Main Line Pictures, Inc. v. Basinger, 1994 WL 814244 (Cal. App. 2d 1994). 
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in Red Owl does not appear to have thrown courts off track.54 Ironically, assuming 
the court decided the case incorrectly, the court's error may have had the effect of 
alerting future courts to the tenuous nature of promissory estoppel in the 
precontractual setting.55 Perhaps Hoffman's success may have falsely encouraged 
some promisees to bring a promissory estoppel action, but I doubt it. My study of 
promissory estoppel cases strongly suggests that litigants "tack on" a promissory 
estoppel cause of action in breach of contract cases without any strong hope of 
success.56 Ultimately, the Red Owl decision, whether right or wrong, helped 
establish I think correctly that courts should recognize the possibility of promissory 
estoppel at the negotiation stage. 
 An illustration from another leading case may help substantiate my 
argument that a decision may be incorrect, but still helpful doctrinally.  In Jacob & 
Youngs v. Kent,57 Cardozo decided that Jacob & Youngs, a contractor, had 
substantially performed construction of a house even though the contract called for 
Reading pipe and the contractor mostly had installed other pipe of the same quality 
and value.  Cardozo found that the contract term calling for Reading pipe was a 
promise and not a condition precedent that would excuse Kent’s final payment.  
However, the record in the case, which Cardozo failed to mention, revealed that 
other terms in the contract likely established that Reading pipe was a condition 
precedent.58  Nonetheless, the case has real precedential value in establishing the 
methods and implications of distinguishing promises and conditions and has 
successfully guided precedent in numerous cases that followed it. 
B.  Should courts rely on Bill and Stewart's (or Bob Scott's) unearthed facts?  
                                                            
54 See supra notes  , and accompanying text. 
55 See infra notes   , and accompanying text. Scott believes, on the other hand, that Red Owl is 
"quite inconsistent with the now-dominant view of when courts should use the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel to protect precontractual reliance." Scott, Legal Method, supra note  , at   . 
Scott is referring to the holding, I assume, not the court's presentation of the rule. 
56 Robert A. Hillman, Questioning the 'New Consensus' on Promissory Estoppel: An Empirical 
and Theoretical Study, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 580,   (1998). 
 
57 230 N.Y. 239, 129 N.E. 889 (1921). 
58 J. Dawson, W. Harvey, and S. Henderson, Cases and Comment on Contracts 816-17 (4th ed. 
1982); see also Kenneth K. Ching, Justice and Harsh Results: Beyond Individualism and 
Collectivism in Contracts, SSRN. 
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 I have already identified several ways in which the Red Owl debate advances 
students', lawyers', and academics' understanding of the issues that arise upon 
applying promissory estoppel in the negotiation stage and of the nature of promise 
and reliance in this setting.  But several additional issues arise if a court 
contemplates using the facts derived from the record but missing from the official 
report of a previous decision either to support its conclusion in the current case or 
to distinguish the earlier case.59 
 Combing a record to find additional facts may be unreliable. Researchers 
may reach different conclusions on the facts and on their meaning.60  Our debaters, 
of course, substantiate this concern.  In addition, such expeditions into the record 
and conclusions drawn have the potential for undermining the certainty of 
precedent:  "Because virtually any decision would be potentially vulnerable to 
impeachment, and because it is rarely possible to establish conclusively why a 
court decided the way it did, people would have little sense of how courts would 
interpret the case law and therefore little idea of what the law is on a given legal 
issue."61 Especially destabilizing, courts (and scholars) likely would not rely on 
precedent until the record was thoroughly explored to determine the validity of the 
holding.  And without uniform rules and processes for analyzing the record, courts 
would have difficulty evaluating the relevance of uncovered facts.62  Even if such 
an exercise were feasible, courts would be challenged developing the boundaries of 
acceptable supplementary materials.  For example, mining the record may seem 
more reasonable than outside research, but might depend on who is doing the 
mining or outside research, the methods they are employing, and what they 
uncover.63  
                                                            
59 Charles Barzun helpfully illuminates these concerns in a recent paper (although he seeks to 
debunk them primarily in the context of Supreme Court adjudication). See Charles L. Barzun, 
Impeaching Precedent, 80 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1625, 1672-1677 (2013). 
60  Id. at 1672.  "The problem is further aggravated by the fact that such historical inquiry is 
conducted by lawyers, who are not known for being very good historians."  Id.  
61   Id. at 1672-1673.  In response to this argument, Professor Barzun reasons that "it is difficult 
to see why adding one more means of analyzing a precedent would effect a sea change in the 
relative determinacy of the law." Id. at 1675. 
62  Id. at 1677.  
63  Although Bill and Stewart interviewed Hoffman, they verified his remarks by examining the 
trial record. Whitford and Macaulay, The Rest of the Story, supra note  , at 805. 
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 Bill and Stewart are not unaware of the limitations of their method.  They 
concede that their analysis unconsciously might favor Hoffman, either because 
they interviewed him and formed a connection or because of their own biases on 
the appropriateness of promissory estoppel in the case.64  Further, although they 
tried, they were unable to interview Red Owl officials to get their side of the story.  
And they were not present to hear the actual testimony, which may translate very 
differently than the written page or Hoffman’s remembrances many years later.65 
 In short, there is a good argument that the Red Owl debate is a valuable 
contribution for students, lawyers, and academics.  Attempting to get closer to the 
truth outside the courtroom may be beneficial for those audiences. On the other 
hand, courts in later cases should entertain the facts that surface from exploring the 
record with caution. More important in assessing precedential value, especially 
taking into account rule-of-law concerns, is a court's own treatment and recitation 
of the facts, which most reliably establishes the meaning and significance of a 
case.66 Perhaps there are some exceptions where judicial reliance on supplemental 
facts from the record of a previous case makes sense.  For example, combing a 
record to reveal information that explains an opaque or ambiguous precedent 
(which I do not believe includes Red Owl, even if factually incorrect) may 
outweigh the potential problems of unreliability and uncertainty.67 But courts 
                                                            
64  Id. at 849. 
65   Not infrequently, I, and I'm sure others, completely misinterpret an email because of the 
absence of tone and facial expression. 
66  Kevin M. Clermont, Civil Procedure Stories, Introduction:  
A practical reason is not to uncover the cases' "true meaning" in the sense of discovering 
new facts or circumstances that revolutionize how we read the cases. Sometimes 
advocates do that to distinguish and so undermine a troublesome precedent. But that is in 
large part a lawyer's trick to mislead the court. Given our system of stare decisis, courts 
have to take precedents pretty much at face value. How the deciding court stated and 
understood the facts and circumstances fixes the context for deciphering the holding. 
 
67  Email from Kevin Clermont to Robert Hillman, March  , 2014. 
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should be reluctant to go much further. Certainly a court should not rely on the 
record of a previous case to contradict that court's own findings.68 
 C.  What does the use of the record portend for the future of promissory 
estoppel in the bargaining setting?  
 Ironically, the debaters' efforts on understanding Red Owl ultimately may 
undermine still further judicial use of promissory estoppel in the precontractual 
setting.  The felt need to substantiate the decision or to refute it by combing the 
record and interviewing parties legitimizes complaints about the court's holding 
and reinforces the view that the chance of error is sufficiently large that promissory 
estoppel does not belong in the precontractual setting at all.  Further, examining the 
record in Red Owl does nothing to reduce the inevitable tension between the 
principle that legal obligation in the contract setting arises only after the parties 
form a contract and the contrary idea that a party can be liable for inducing 
reasonable reliance during negotiations. Instead, perhaps, the debate only draws 
attention to this dilemma and will motivate courts to shy away from promissory 
estoppel in the precontractual setting.  Of course, once Bob Scott published his 
article, Bill and Stewart can justifiably argue that the benefits of their rise to the 
challenge outweigh any of these concerns. 
Conclusion 
 Bill Whitford has been a giant in the law and society movement.  His 
contributions far surpass those mentioned here.  But I hope that this paper suffices 
to reveal Bill's important contributions to contract law and, particularly, the value 
of trying to learn the whole story. For me, historical inquiry helps clarify the 
appropriate place for promissory estoppel in the legal lexicon, but courts, in a 
system of stare decisis, should ordinarily be reluctant to rely on it. 
                                                            
68  Id. These observations also suggest caution before embracing historical facts outside of the 
record to refute a decision. An exception to such reticence might be to impeach decisions that 
rest on illegitimate grounds in order to avoid an injustice. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 
323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
